Jones and Black

Frankfurt has a series of thought experiments designed to show that PAP is false. We are to imagine Black, an evil genius who is capable of making terrible threats and even of physically controlling the brains of others. Jones has decided for his own reasons to perform some action, such as assassinate the president. After Jones has already decided to do this, Black tries to make sure that Jones will indeed perform this action. In a mild case, we can imagine that Black is merely threatening Jones with something that no reasonable person would want to happen (e.g., Black threatens to murder Jones if he does not kill the president). In an extreme case, we imagine that Black is actually in control of Jones's brain. Depending on how Jones responds to Black's coercion, in some cases Jones will still be morally responsible for his actions even though he could not have done otherwise. Jones 1 is an unreasonable man. He is completely non-responsive to the threats. He continues to perform his action regardless of what threats Black makes. Jones 2 is completely overwhelmed by the threat. Even if he wanted to do the action in the first place, he is so afraid of the threats that they motivate him to perform the action even if he did not have his own reasons for doing so. Jones 3 is a reasonable man. He is responsive to the threats; he takes them seriously. But he still performs the actions for his own reasons. Frankfurt says that Jones 3 is a perfect example of someone performing an action that he had to do, but he is still morally responsible. The important question is whether the coercive force was the reason for his action. In the case of Jones 2, the coercion was certainly the reason for his actions, so he is not morally responsible. But Jones 3 did not act as he did BECAUSE of the coercion. Rather, Jones 3 acted because of his own reasons, so we still hold him morally responsible.

PAP and Moral Responsibility

Principle of Alternate Possiblities (PAP): a person is morally responsible for actions only if he or she could have done otherwise. In other words, moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities (AP) for action.

PAP AND INCOMPATIBALISM: An Argument Against Moral Responsibility

1. If Determinism is true, then there are no alternative possibilities for your actions.

2. Determinism is true.

3. Therefore, there are no alternate possibilities for your actions.

This argument can be expressed in the form of modus ponens:

1. If D, then ~AP

2. D

3. Therefore, ~AP

4. If you are morally responsible, then there must be alternate possibilities for your actions (PAP).

5. There is no alternative possibilities for your actions (if determinism is true)

6. Therefore, there is no moral responsibility.

This argument can be expressed in the form of modus tollens:

4. If MR, then AP.

5. ~AP

6. Therefore, ~MR.

Frankfurt denies the truth of Premise #4! His thought experiments are supposed to show that there are situations where there are no alternative possibilities for action, and yet a person is still morally responsible.

Moral Responsibility: Some Basic Terms Defined

Moral responsibility is responsibility for your actions such that you can be held morally accountable. The question of whether you are morally responsible is a question of whether your actions can be judged as morally good or bad.

Questions about moral responsibility often hinge on questions about free will and determinism.

TWO DOCTRINES ABOUT FREE WILL

Determinism: A person’s actions are determined (caused by) external forces.

Existentialism: A person chooses how to act and who to be. Objects may be determined by external factors, but people determine themselves.

TWO DOCTRINES ABOUT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FREE WILL

Compatibalism: Determinism and moral responsibility are compatible. You do not need to be the cause of all your choices and actions in order to be responsible for them

Incompatibalism: Determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. You must be the cause of your own choices and actions in order to be responsible for them.

***Just because you are an incompatibalist does not mean you think that moral responsibility is impossible. But if you are an incompatibalist AND you think determinism is true, then you must deny the existence of moral responsibility.   

Pfizz #1 and Answers

1. What is the problem of personal identity?

How can we say that I am the same person now as I was when I was younger? What does it mean to be a person?

2. What is Locke's solution to the problem of personal identity?

Locke says that the identity of a person is constituted by conscious awareness of autobiographical memories. You are whoever you remember being and whatever you remember doing.

3. Explain the brave officer example and how it proves Locke wrong.

A person, P, may remember an event, A, during the time of another event, B. During event C, he remembers event B but not event A. If memory constitutes personal identity, then A = B and B = C (since at B he remembers A and at C he remembers B). By the law of transitivity of identity, C should be identical to A. Yet this would violate Locke's criterion for personal identity, because at C, he does not remember A.  

4. How did Parfit clarify the problem of personal identity?

Parfit clarifies that theories about what a person is that lead to a violation of the transitivity of identity are not bad simply because they violate the transitivity of identity. Parfit says that when we talk about a person being the same as me, we're not talking about strict numerical identity. Rather, we're talking about something else: survival. Survival requires neither a 1:1 ratio nor an all-or-nothing categorization.  

How Secure Are Memories?

Here is a link to the video from class where Derren Brown convinces Simon Pegg that he's always wanted a red BMX bike (with an explanation afterwards!).

This clip seems to indicate a problem with relying too heavily on memories to serve as a criterion of personal identity.  If our memories can be changed, then how can I say that I am my memory?

This video also raises some questions about moral responsibility.  If we can be controlled by other people, are we responsible for our actions?

Here is the link to Derren Brown's The Experiments: The Assassin.  In this video, you see Derren Brown attempt to brainwash and hypnotize someone into being a sleeper assassin.

In another video, Derren Brown's The Experiments: Guilt Trip, Derren tries to convince an innocent man that he is guilty of a murder that never happened.  This video raises concerns about the reliability of memory and questions about moral responsibility and its relationship to feelings of guilt.

Alternate Possibilities for Actions and Hip Hop

Usually, answers to questions about whether we are morally responsible for our actions depend on answers to questions about whether we control our own lives.

In the track "Positions of Strength", rapper Felix of Heiruspecs contemplates the ways in which our lives are controlled by existing organizational structures. 

Parfit: Identity vs. Survival

Parfit attempts to clarify debates about personal identity by introducing a distinction between identity and survival.  Although traditional theories about what a person is focus on identity, Parfit says that concerns about being the same person as myself are actually concerns about survival.

Follow this link to read another blog post where I discuss this distinction in some detail.

This is another link to a blog post about the contrast between Locke and Parfit