Van Inwagen vs. Frankfurt

Frankfurt attempts to argue for compatibalism.  He wants to show that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible.  In order to do this, he shows that a classic incompatibalist thesis, PAP, is false.  PAP is the principle that states that you are morally responsible for an action only if you could have done otherwise.  Frankfurt provides thought experiments that are meant to show that there will be times that a person is morally responsible even if he or she could not have done otherwise than they did.

Van Inwagen wants to defend incompatibalism.  He thinks that there is a principle better than PAP that is not vulnerable to the kind of counterexamples that Frankfurt provides.  Van Inwagen's new incompatbalist principle is PPP: you are morally responsible for a something only if you could have prevented that thing from happening.

Remember Jones and Black.  Jones has decided to assassinate the president, and Black has put a device in Jones' brain that will make him kill the president even if he decides not to go through with it.  This is supposed to show that PAP is false, since if the reason why Jones does what he does is because he wants to (and not because he is forced to), then we would hold him morally responsible even if he could not have acted otherwise.  But when we apply PPP to this case, the tension seems to be resolved.  Jones could not prevent himself from killing the president,  so he is not morally responsible for this action.  This is supposed to be a principle that is not disproven by a case like Jones and Black.

According to PPP, moral responsibility requires the possibility to prevent states of affairs from obtaining.  So if determinism is true, then there are no states of affairs that can be prevented.  So there is no state of affairs for which anyone is responsible.

Frankurt responds that to talk about the ability to prevent things as a condition for moral responsibility (as states in PPP) is to stop talking about free will.  Frankfurt says that free will only has to do with what actions I perform with my body---the consequences that arise as a result of my actions are irrelevant to my free will.

PAP vs. PPP

Frankfurt's goal was to argue that determinism and moral responsibility are compatible.  He attempted to prove this by showing that PAP is false.  PAP is the principle that you are morally responsible for your actions only if you could have done otherwise.  PAP is a classic way of stating that incompatibalist thesis.  In other words, PAP means that moral responsibility and determinism are mutually exclusive.  By using thought experiments (Jones and Black) to show that PAP is false, Frankfurt attempted to defend the thesis of compatibalism: determinism and moral responsibility are compatible.

Van Inwagen thinks that Frankfurt has not successfully argued for the compatibalist thesis.  Van Inwagen thinks that PAP can be replaced with a better principle: PPP.  The Principle of Possible Prevention states that you are morally responsible for a state of affairs only if you could have prevented it from obtaining.  In other words, you are morally responsible for something only when you could have prevented that thing from happening.  PPP has the benefit that it cannot be proven false by thought experiments such as Jones and Black.

Doctrine of Coercion and PAP

PAP is the principle that you are only morally responsible for your actions if there was an alternate possibility for your actions. In other words, moral responsibility requires that you could have acted differently than you did act. Frankfurt thinks that PAP gets some credibility from its association with the Doctrine of Coercion (DoC). DoC is the principle that if you are coerced into doing something, then you are not morally responsible for that action. In other words, coercion and moral responsibility are mutually exclusive. Coercion means being forced to do something, either by physical force, threats or intimidation. Frankfurt thinks that DoC is true. He also thinks that many people believe PAP in part because they think that DoC is just a more particularized version of PAP. In other words, Frankfurt thinks that being coerced is just one way of being unable to act otherwise. Frankfurt clarifies that the reason why we excuse someone when they were coerced is because the coercion is the reason why they acted as they did. But DoC can be true even if PAP is false. Frankfurt provides thought experiments meant to show that there are instances when a person lacks any alternative possibilities for action and yet that person is still morally responsible. A person is excused from moral responsibility only if the coercion or the inability to do otherwise are the only reason why a person acted as they did. Frankfurt then offers up a revised version of PAP, according to which you are morally responsible for you actions if you acted that way only because you could not do otherwise.

Jones and Black

Frankfurt has a series of thought experiments designed to show that PAP is false. We are to imagine Black, an evil genius who is capable of making terrible threats and even of physically controlling the brains of others. Jones has decided for his own reasons to perform some action, such as assassinate the president. After Jones has already decided to do this, Black tries to make sure that Jones will indeed perform this action. In a mild case, we can imagine that Black is merely threatening Jones with something that no reasonable person would want to happen (e.g., Black threatens to murder Jones if he does not kill the president). In an extreme case, we imagine that Black is actually in control of Jones's brain. Depending on how Jones responds to Black's coercion, in some cases Jones will still be morally responsible for his actions even though he could not have done otherwise. Jones 1 is an unreasonable man. He is completely non-responsive to the threats. He continues to perform his action regardless of what threats Black makes. Jones 2 is completely overwhelmed by the threat. Even if he wanted to do the action in the first place, he is so afraid of the threats that they motivate him to perform the action even if he did not have his own reasons for doing so. Jones 3 is a reasonable man. He is responsive to the threats; he takes them seriously. But he still performs the actions for his own reasons. Frankfurt says that Jones 3 is a perfect example of someone performing an action that he had to do, but he is still morally responsible. The important question is whether the coercive force was the reason for his action. In the case of Jones 2, the coercion was certainly the reason for his actions, so he is not morally responsible. But Jones 3 did not act as he did BECAUSE of the coercion. Rather, Jones 3 acted because of his own reasons, so we still hold him morally responsible.

PAP and Moral Responsibility

Principle of Alternate Possiblities (PAP): a person is morally responsible for actions only if he or she could have done otherwise. In other words, moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities (AP) for action.

PAP AND INCOMPATIBALISM: An Argument Against Moral Responsibility

1. If Determinism is true, then there are no alternative possibilities for your actions.

2. Determinism is true.

3. Therefore, there are no alternate possibilities for your actions.

This argument can be expressed in the form of modus ponens:

1. If D, then ~AP

2. D

3. Therefore, ~AP

4. If you are morally responsible, then there must be alternate possibilities for your actions (PAP).

5. There is no alternative possibilities for your actions (if determinism is true)

6. Therefore, there is no moral responsibility.

This argument can be expressed in the form of modus tollens:

4. If MR, then AP.

5. ~AP

6. Therefore, ~MR.

Frankfurt denies the truth of Premise #4! His thought experiments are supposed to show that there are situations where there are no alternative possibilities for action, and yet a person is still morally responsible.