Showing posts with label Parfit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Parfit. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 5, 2014

Parfit on Personal 'Identity'

The problem of personal identity is the question about how we define a person.  In other words, what makes me me?  How do we decide if there is some person who is the same person as me?  Locke answers this problem by saying that personal identity consists of autobiographical memories.  Reid shows that this theory will violate the transitivity of identity.  Parfit's contribution to the literature on the problem of personal identity is to note that strict numerical identity might not be the appropriate concept.  Rather, he talks about survival.  The question of whether you survive is the same question as whether there is some person who is you.  In the links below, I discuss the difference between identity and survival in more detail.

Parfit on PID.

Identity vs. Survival.

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Pfizz #1 and Answers

1. What is the problem of personal identity?

How can we say that I am the same person now as I was when I was younger? What does it mean to be a person?

2. What is Locke's solution to the problem of personal identity?

Locke says that the identity of a person is constituted by conscious awareness of autobiographical memories. You are whoever you remember being and whatever you remember doing.

3. Explain the brave officer example and how it proves Locke wrong.

A person, P, may remember an event, A, during the time of another event, B. During event C, he remembers event B but not event A. If memory constitutes personal identity, then A = B and B = C (since at B he remembers A and at C he remembers B). By the law of transitivity of identity, C should be identical to A. Yet this would violate Locke's criterion for personal identity, because at C, he does not remember A.  

4. How did Parfit clarify the problem of personal identity?


Parfit clarifies that theories about what a person is that lead to a violation of the transitivity of identity are not bad simply because they violate the transitivity of identity. Parfit says that when we talk about a person being the same as me, we're not talking about strict numerical identity. Rather, we're talking about something else: survival. Survival requires neither a 1:1 ratio nor an all-or-nothing categorization.  

Monday, September 9, 2013

Parfit: Identity vs. Survival

Parfit attempts to clarify debates about personal identity by introducing a distinction between identity and survival.  Although traditional theories about what a person is focus on identity, Parfit says that concerns about being the same person as myself are actually concerns about survival.

Follow this link to read another blog post where I discuss this distinction in some detail.

This is another link to a blog post about the contrast between Locke and Parfit