Lots of Locke!

In this post, I write about the problem of personal identity and Locke.

In this one, I explain how different things have different criteria for identity, according to Locke.

Here I give some context for Locke.

AND HERE I link to two tracks from members of MN hip hop collective Doomtree: P.O.S.'s De la Souls & Dessa's The Man I Knew.

Locke on Living Things

"That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants." (Bk. II, Ch. XXVII, sect. 4)

In the above passage, Locke explains that the identity of a plant is determined by the fact that a plant participates in 'one common life' with 'an organization of parts' in one body.  Even though the life is 'communicated to new particles of matter', these new particles are 'vitally united' to the plant.  Vital here means not only essential but also related to the life of the plant (c.f., vital signs, vitality).

Even a cell is a living thing with an organization of parts.  The different parts of the cell each have a function in preserving and perpetuating the life of the cell.  Although the specific particles or atoms that make up the cell may change over time, the life is a continuous one.  The body may exchange some particles for others, but it remains coherent.

Korsgaard and 2 Senses of 'Good'

Korsgaard distinguishes between two ways that we use the word 'good'. First, there is the everyday 'evaluative' sense of the word. For example, when we call something a good book, a good car, a good pair of shoes, a good cup of coffee, etc. In the evaluative sense, a thing is good according to our goals. There is also the 'final' sense of good, i.e., 'the good'. This sense of the word means something like the final aim or total goodness for a thing. This is often thought to be something that is good for it's own sake (good in itself). In this paper, Korsgaard is concerned with the nature of 'the good'.

She then contrasts three theories about the final good. Intrinsic good theory is the theory that goodness is a real property of an object. For example, an action is morally good as a matter of fact in the same way that my new shoes are red. Hedonism is the theory that the final good is what makes us happy. Eudaimonism is the theory that the final good is to function well or to have one's own biological organism in a state of well-being. Korsgaard argues that the benefit of a eudaimonistic theory is that it can explain the relationship between evaluative good and final good. In order to explain this, she introduces the extended-evaluative sense of the word. To be good in the extended-evaluative sense means to be good for some purpose and also be be functioning healthily. In this sense, to have a final good just means to be aware of oneself as being in good condition. In other words, having a final good means being able to take an evaluative approach to one's own life.  As such, the final good requires some level of reflexivity.    In other words, to have a final good, one must be aware of one's final good.  It seems that rational consciousness either introduces another kind of final good or it is a more complex awareness of one's own final good.  Either way, having a final good requires reflexivity.

Heidegger on Dwelling

Heidegger notes that buliding is the manner in which mortals dwell on earth.  To dwell is more than to simply reside or have an address somewhere.  To dwell requires a certain receptivity.  To dwell requires to reveal the Fourfold.  What is the fourfold?  The fourfold is a unity of four different things.  Each of the four parts of the fourfold can only be truly understood in relationship with the other parts.  First, there are the mortals.  Mortals dwell on this earth and have the capacity to regard their death as death; this just means that we can think of death not just as a stopping point of our lives but as something that unifies and brings meaning to our lives.  We can imagine that our lives will end in the sense that a big project has come an end.  Second, there is the earth.  The earth is what nourishes us and sustains us.  The earth is where we get the resources for our projects.  Third is the sky.  The sky represents open possibilities.  Whereas the earth is grounded in practical possibilities, the sky is open.  Fourth are divinities.  Divinities are inherently beyond human comprehension. 

To dwell, then, means to reveal these four things in association with one another.  A peasant farmhouse makes a place to divinities to be welcomed as divinities--which means that we wait for divinities as something unknown.  The roof of a farmhouse is steep to avoid snow building up.  This represents a way in which dwelling requires the ability to be open to possibilities.  Also, the farmhouse is placed on the protected side of a mountain.  This shows how the dwelling takes advantage of practical possibilities already present on the earth.  And this is a place of dwelling for mortals as it serves our human purposes.

Heidegger on the Technological Attitude

When Heidegger talks about the 'essence of technology', he is not concerned with specific technologies (iPads, cell phones, hydroelectric dams, etc.).  Rather, he is concerned with a technological attitude, or way of approaching things.  In this sense, technology is a way of uncovering the truth about things.  The traditional theory of truth is that sentences are true when they correspond to reality.  Heidegger's theory of truth is that things are true when they are uncovered as themselves.  Technology is one way of uncovering things.  All acts of uncovering are dangerous.  To uncover one thing is to cover up another thing.  Think about digging a hole in the dirt.  When you dig up one thing, the dirt you removed has to go somewhere.  The kind of uncovering that characterizes the essence of technology is Gestell, or enframing.  Enframing is a way of uncovering things that necessarily prevents other modes of uncovering and revealing.  Technological enframing reveals all things as energy to be unlocked, transformed, transferred and stored. 

Singer on Vegetarianism

Singer argues that if one accepts utilitarianism, then one must also accept vegetarianism.  Basically, if you accept that pain is morally bad, then eating meat is bad on the grounds that is causes pain to animals. 

1. If Utilitarianism is true, then pain and pleasure are the basis of all moral value.

2.  Animals experience pleasure and pain.

3.  If pleasure and pain are the basis of all moral value, then animals are morally significant.

4.  So, if utilitarianism is true, then animals are morally significant.

Singer notes that there are three ways that this kind of argument seems to fall short of supporting full-fledged vegetarianism.  First, it seems like utilitarianism gives good reason only to avoid certain kinds of sourcing meat.  Specifically, it seems like factory farming should be avoided but that free-range organic methods of raising animals are morally neutral or good.  Singer replies by reminding the reader that A) most meat on the market is from factory farms and B) even if we raise livestock in humane ways before we kill and eat it, even the mere act of killing animals puts us on a slippery slope towards further harm towards animals.  Second, someone might object that the consequences of abolishing factory farming are worse than the consequences of business as usual.  Singer notes that many things must be taken into account: the potential loss of happiness of vegetarians, the loss of livelihood of producers of factory-farmed products, environmental consequences, global and individual health concerns and the suffering of animals.  Even if the loss to those employed by the industrial livestock industry were greater than the suffering animals are caused now, Singer notes that this would be a one-time loss of happiness, whereas business as usual means the continued suffering of animals.  Third, Singer note that some people may think that consequentialist analysis cannot lead to the conclusion of vegetarianism.  Consider, for example, that it may take ten thousand vegetarians to save the lives of twenty thousand chickens.  Unless you are the ten thousandth vegetarian, then you will not meet a threshold needed to save those chickens.  But Singers says that consequentialists act based on likely outcomes, so being certain that I save ten chickens is just as good as being the single vegetarian responsible for saving twenty thousand chickens.  Perhaps this is not his best point.  But he notes that refusing to consume meat is the most straightforward and practical step to limit meat consumption.  Also, by refusing to eat meat, one expresses condemnation for a practice that causes animals to suffer.  Either way, Singer thinks that utilitarianism will lead to vegetarianism.

Proof of the Greatest Happiness Principle

Mill's Proof of the Greatest Happiness Principle.
(1) if you see something, this proves that it is visible.
(2) Similarly, desiring something proves that it is desirable.
(3) The only thing that each person truly desires is happiness.
(4) The only thing that is truly desirable for a person is his or her own happiness.
(5) Hence each person should perform the actions that promote the greatest happiness.

Three Problems with this Argument:
First,  (2) does not follow from (1).  Visibility and desirability are not the same kinds of things.
Second,  (4) does not follow from (3).  To assume that we can derive an "ought" from an "is" is to make the naturalistic fallacy, which is a point made by David Hume.
Third,  (5) does not follow from (4).  Just because your own happiness is desirable does not mean that the happiness of other people is also desirable.

Further Objections to Utilitarianism:
(1) We cannot always predict what the consequences of our actions will be.  It is difficult if not impossible to judge the morality of an action based on what the predicted consequences will be.
(2) It is difficult to quantify pleasures.  In other words, it is hard to represent pleasures with numbers in order to determine if happiness will be maximized by an action. Cost-benefit analysis is difficult if not impossible.
(3) Also, the process of trying to determine if an action will maximize happiness is time-consuming and difficult.  It is not practical that we will be able to do such a calculation before we perform an action.
(4) Utilitarianism cannot explain special duties or obligations that we have to people like our friends, family and neighbors.
(5) If we only care about sum total happiness, then there will be actions that are good while these actions do cause a great amount of pain for some people.  For example, say that six of the seven dwarves decide to torture, beat and murder the Dopey for fun.  Even though Dopey experiences a lot of pain, utility is still maximized because the other dwarves are so happy.  Thus a utilitarian must say that it is good for the dwarves to murder Dopey.
(6) Utilitarianism fails to respect individual rights.  The rights of a single person can be violated as long as the greatest good is still maximized.
(7) Utilitarianism does not address the question of what kind of a person we should be.  The focus is entirely on consequences rather than the character of people.  For example, if I am offered a job as an assassin, I might think that killing people for a job would be OK because even if I do not take the job, someone else will.  This means that whether or not I am an assassin, the consequences are the same, hence the moral value of either choice is equal.
(8)  Pain is either entirely subjective (meaning that it does not exist) or perhaps pain is a good thing itself.

The first three objections do not attack the theory but rather the practice of the theory.  Objections (1), (2) and (3) are all objections that the theory is impractical and difficult (if not impossible) to use as a way of making moral decisions.  Objections (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) object on the grounds that the results of utilitarian theory will conflict with strong moral intuitions or other reasons to consider when deciding if an action is good or bad.