Strawson: What is at Stake?

Strawson provides the basic argument, which is meant to show that true moral responsibility is impossible.  In short, because we are not responsible for how we are, we are not responsible for what we do.  He thinks that any compatibalist notion of moral responsibility will be too weak.

But why should we care if I cannot be in control of every single thing about myself?  Why does it matter if there are some things that I do or some ways that I am that I do not control?  Well, Strawson reminds us of the notion of heaven and hell.  Hell is a place of eternal punishment.  Heaven is a place of eternal reward.  If we are not completely responsible for who we are or what we do, then it seems like no person will ever really deserve heaven or hell!  In order to be deserving of either eternal punishment or eternal rewards, it seems like there must be absolute moral responsibility for actions.  And as Strawson points out, absolute responsibility for what we do depends on absolute responsibility for who we are.  Since we don't control everything about ourselves (where we were born, what family morals we were brought up with, etc.), we cannot be truly responsible in a way that makes us deserve either heaven or hell.

3 Responses to the Basic Argument

Strawson talks about three basic kinds of responses to the Basic Argument.

1.  The compatibalist response will be to say that moral responsibility does not require that a person is completely in control of how they are.  In other words, one can say that moral responsibility is compatible with my inability to completely shape who I am.  Strawson responds to this by saying that such responsibility is not 'true' moral responsibility.

2.  The libertarian will simply deny that what I do is determined by who I am.  Some actions are indeterministic, according to Kane.  Strawson replies that in such a case, the indeterministic nature of my actions only makes them more random.  This randomness also seems to conflict with the notion that I am morally responsible.

An alternate libertarian objection would be simply to deny that determinism is true.

3.  The phenomenological response will be so say that it feels like there is some self, S, that can act independently from all the contingent facts about myself.  In other words, no matter what my pre-existing personality, character and motivations are, my 'self' can still choose to act independently of these facts.  Strawson responds by saying that in reality, this 'self' is dependent upon your character, personality and existing motivational structures.

Strawson: The Basic Argument

Strawson presents what he calls The Basic Argument, which is supposed to show that moral responsibility is impossible.  The argument goes like this:

1.  You do what you do because you are the way you are.

2.  To be truly morally responsible for what you do, you must be responsible for the way you are.

3.  Since you can't be responsible for the way you are, you can't be truly responsible for what you do.

4.  To be truly responsible for the way you are, you must have intentionally brought it about, which is impossible.

5.  If you intentionally brought about how you are, you must have first had a certain nature that allowed you to intentionally choose to be a certain way.

6.  In order to be truly responsible for how you are, then you must be responsible for the 'certain nature' that allowed you to choose.

7.  If you could intentionally bring about a certain nature, then you must have already had a prior nature that allowed you to choose the 'certain nature' that allows you to choose the way you are...

The problem is that if you try to explain your behavior in terms of your own choices, you must also appeal to a capacity for choice that must be present before your choices are made.  For each choice, there must be the ability to make that choice.  So if you want to explain behavior in terms of choice, you always must introduce a capacity for choice-making.  Doing so leads to an infinite regress.

The main point is that humans are not causa sui.  In other terms, human are not the ultimate causes of themselves.  It seems like true moral responsibility requires that we are causa sui.  Because we are not the ultimate causes of ourselves, we cannot be truly morally responsible.