Hiedegger: Being and Time

What follows is a list of definitions of terms and clarifications of those definitions.

For Heidegger, Being is whatever transcends our reality/existence.  Traditionally, philosophers have understood Being as a substance or a kind of stuff.  Heidegger wants to avoid this substance ontology and instead is concerned with Being as something that transcends all beings, or all things in our reality. 

Whereas Being is the most universal concept, the fact that it transcends our reality means that it is most obscure, so we cannot think of its universality in terms of a genus to a species, as philosophers have traditionally thought.  Another prejudice of traditional ontology is to think that just because Being is not able to be defined in terms of beings (things in our reality), this eliminates the question of Being.  But Heidegger thinks we just need a new kind of questioning.  Although we lack clear knowledge about Being in spite of that fact that it is a self-evident concept insofar as it is part of everything, the reason why we have no clear knowledge of it is because its everydayness obscures it. 

So rather than do traditional ontology, Heidegger wants to do fundamental ontology as the existential analysis of Dasein.  Dasein, or people, are the kinds of beings who in their Being as a being are concerned with their own Being.  In other words, part of our essence as physical beings is to be concerned with what transcends our own existence. 

Dasein is also able to reveal truth.  For Heidegger, truth is what we call it when something is revealed as it is itself.  Truth as uncovering or revealing is contrasted with the traditional correspondence theory of truth, according to which sentences are true insofar as they correspond to reality.  In other words, the traditional theory of truth says that statements are true because they accurately represent some fact about the world.  In contrast, Heidegger thinks that truth is in the things themselves when they are revealed as they really are.

The title of the book, Being and Time, reflects the fact that Heidegger thinks that time is the basic meaningful structure for our existence.  Dasein is its past and its past is always ahead of itself.  To say that Dasein is its past means that Dasein is shaped by its history.  To say that its past is always ahead of itself means that our future is also shaped by our history.  These features of the meaningful structure of time are the result of Dasein's ecstatic temporality.  Although the experience of time is as of a series of 'now' moments, the meaning of time is such that our past shapes our present and future.  In addition, our present determines how we interpret our past and how we envision our future.  Likewise, our envisioned future changes how we interpret our past and our present.

Tons of Links

Hello, folks!  All the links listed below are for this website.

Here I link to previous posts about Locke on PID.

This is a short bit about Locke on Living Things.

Here I connect issues of personal identity with Star Trek.

Various Links on Parfit and PID.

The relationship between personal identity and moral responsibility is explored here.

Pfizz #1 and the relationship between PAP and moral responsibility are addressed here.

Humans are Fleshy Robots?

In Breakfast of Champions, a novel by Kurt Vonnegut, the main character reads a book that convinces him that all other humans are no more than fleshy machines.  He believes that he alone is capable of free will.  This belief affects his behaviors towards other people and is a way he justifies mistreating some of them.  This novel is a silly and vulgar expression of the effects of how we define personhood and humanity. 

Unfortunately, Western civilization has seen many similar sorts of stories manifest in real life.  Consider how the ways we define humanity and personhood have been used in the past to justify oppression and violence.  To what extent should our definitions of 'humanity' and 'person' be inclusive?  Consider how such definitions influence our concepts of moral responsibility and morality.  Are there non-human persons?  Is it conceivable that non-humans may have something like 'humanity'?  To what extent is humanity necessary for moral obligations? 

Regan on Vegetarianism

Like Singer, Regan wants to provide an argument for vegetarianism. Unlike Singer, Regan does not want to base his argument on utilitarianism. Instead, Regan thinks that animal rights are the way to defend vegetarianism. We can think of rights in three ways. A legal right is a right granted by a legal authority. A natural right is what people talk about when they think that there is a naturally given right that people (or animals) ought to have. A moral right is just the other side of a moral obligation or duty. If someone has a duty to do X for you, then you have a right to have them do X. Regan is concerned with rights of the second and third kind. Regean claims that Singer's strongest arguments in favor of vegetarianism are arguments based on animals rights. Specifically, it seems that animals have a right to life.

Why might we think that animals have a right to life? Regan thinks that although Singer is wrong to base his arguments in utilitarianism, there is something right about focusing on an animal's capacity for pain. Regan says that the capacity for suffering is the basis of a right to life, or a right to live. He notes even though some humans are non-rational, they still have similar capacities for suffering as non-human animals. Regan says that the reasons why we don't eat non-rational human beings apply to animals as well. Namely, we don't eat non-rational human beings because they have the capacity to suffer. This capacity to suffer is the basis of a right to life. Regan notes that a rights-based approach is better equipped to explain why we do not kill and eat non-rational humans better than utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and egoism (self-interest).

Singer, Utilitarianism, and Vegetarianism

Singer argues that if one accepts utilitarianism, then one must also accept vegetarianism. Basically, if you accept that pain is morally bad, then eating meat is bad on the grounds that is causes pain to animals.

1. If Utilitarianism is true, then pain and pleasure are the basis of all moral value.

2. Animals experience pleasure and pain.

3. If pleasure and pain are the basis of all moral value, then animals are morally significant.

4. So, if utilitarianism is true, then animals are morally significant.

Singer notes that there are three ways that this kind of argument seems to fall short of supporting full-fledged vegetarianism. First, it seems like utilitarianism gives good reason only to avoid certain kinds of sourcing meat. Specifically, it seems like factory farming should be avoided but that free-range organic methods of raising animals are morally neutral or good. Singer replies by reminding the reader that A) most meat on the market is from factory farms and B) even if we raise livestock in humane ways before we kill and eat it, even the mere act of killing animals puts us on a slippery slope towards further harm towards animals. Second, someone might object that the consequences of abolishing factory farming are worse than the consequences of business as usual. Singer notes that many things must be taken into account: the potential loss of happiness of vegetarians, the loss of livelihood of producers of factory-farmed products, environmental consequences, global and individual health concerns and the suffering of animals. Even if the loss to those employed by the industrial livestock industry were greater than the suffering animals are caused now, Singer notes that this would be a one-time loss of happiness, whereas business as usual means the continued suffering of animals. Third, Singer note that some people may think that consequentialist analysis cannot lead to the conclusion of vegetarianism. Consider, for example, that it may take ten thousand vegetarians to save the lives of twenty thousand chickens. Unless you are the ten thousandth vegetarian, then you will not meet a threshold needed to save those chickens. But Singers says that consequentialists act based on likely outcomes, so being certain that I save ten chickens is just as good as being the single vegetarian responsible for saving twenty thousand chickens. Perhaps this is not his best point. But he notes that refusing to consume meat is the most straightforward and practical step to limit meat consumption. Also, by refusing to eat meat, one expresses condemnation for a practice that causes animals to suffer. Either way, Singer thinks that utilitarianism will lead to vegetarianism.

Korsgaard on 2 Senses of 'Good'

Korsgaard distinguishes between two ways that we use the word 'good'. First, there is the everyday 'evaluative' sense of the word. For example, when we call something a good book, a good car, a good pair of shoes, a good cup of coffee, etc. In the evaluative sense, a thing is good according to our goals. There is also the 'final' sense of good, i.e., 'the good'. This sense of the word means something like the final aim or total goodness for a thing. This is often thought to be something that is good for it's own sake (good in itself). In this paper, Korsgaard is concerned with the nature of 'the good'.

She then contrasts three theories about the final good. Intrinsic good theory is the theory that goodness is a real property of an object. For example, an action is morally good as a matter of fact in the same way that my new shoes are red. Hedonism is the theory that the final good is what makes us happy. Eudaimonism is the theory that the final good is to function well or to have one's own biological organism in a state of well-being. Korsgaard argues that the benefit of a eudaimonistic theory is that it can explain the relationship between evaluative good and final good. In order to explain this, she introduces the extended-evaluative sense of the word. To be good in the extended-evaluative sense means to be good for some purpose and also be be functioning healthily. In this sense, to have a final good just means to be aware of oneself as being in good condition. In other words, having a final good means being able to take an evaluative approach to one's own life. As such, the final good requires some level of reflexivity. In other words, to have a final good, one must be aware of one's final good. It seems that rational consciousness either introduces another kind of final good or it is a more complex awareness of one's own final good. Either way, having a final good requires reflexivity.

Korsgaard on Agency

In this article, Korsgaard is concerned with agency. Agency is the ability to perform actions. Someone who can perform actions is an agent. Korsgaard describes two different kinds of theories about agency: the normative account and the natural account. On the natural account, an action is just what happens when there is a causal relationship between a belief and a behavior. This is a purely descriptive account. The normative account of agency is not purely descriptive. On the normative account, an action only happens if the agent's beliefs and actions are organized in a certain way. For example, Plato's account of agency includes the theory that an action is performed only if one's rational capacity is in control of the other parts of the person (spirit and appetite). Kant's account of agency includes the theory that an action is performed only when an agent reflectively considers the axiom that is guiding his action and then proceeds only if the axiom can be made universal law. Korsgaard thinks that any natural account of agency must also be supplemented with a normative account because only a normative account of agency can explain two implications that arise when we attribute agency.

When we attribute agency to someone, Korsgaard says there are two resulting implications. First, it seems like an action is somehow expressive of who a person is and the agent has some kind of ownership over his or her actions. She calls this the identity implication. In other words, actions express the identity of a person. Second, actions can fail in a way that simple causal linkages cannot. For example, the action of dodging a ball has a goal of avoiding being hit by a ball. Even if I move my body in response to a belief or desire, my action has failed if my goal has not been met. Korsgaard calls this the activity implication. Only a normative account of agency can help to explain these two implications.

Heidegger on Dwelling

Heidegger notes that buliding is the manner in which mortals dwell on earth. To dwell is more than to simply reside or have an address somewhere. To dwell requires a certain receptivity. To dwell requires to reveal the Fourfold. What is the fourfold? The fourfold is a unity of four different things. Each of the four parts of the fourfold can only be truly understood in relationship with the other parts. First, there are the mortals. Mortals dwell on this earth and have the capacity to regard their death as death; this just means that we can think of death not just as a stopping point of our lives but as something that unifies and brings meaning to our lives. We can imagine that our lives will end in the sense that a big project has come an end. Second, there is the earth. The earth is what nourishes us and sustains us. The earth is where we get the resources for our projects. Third is the sky. The sky represents open possibilities. Whereas the earth is grounded in practical possibilities, the sky is open. Fourth are divinities. Divinities are inherently beyond human comprehension.

To dwell, then, means to reveal these four things in association with one another. A peasant farmhouse makes a place to divinities to be welcomed as divinities--which means that we wait for divinities as something unknown. The roof of a farmhouse is steep to avoid snow building up. This represents a way in which dwelling requires the ability to be open to possibilities. Also, the farmhouse is placed on the protected side of a mountain. This shows how the dwelling takes advantage of practical possibilities already present on the earth. And this is a place of dwelling for mortals as it serves our human purposes.

Heidegger on Technology

When Heidegger talks about the 'essence of technology', he is not concerned with specific technologies (iPads, cell phones, hydroelectric dams, etc.). Rather, he is concerned with a technological attitude, or way of approaching things. In this sense, technology is a way of uncovering the truth about things. The traditional theory of truth is that sentences are true when they correspond to reality. Heidegger's theory of truth is that things are true when they are uncovered as themselves. Technology is one way of uncovering things. All acts of uncovering are dangerous. To uncover one thing is to cover up another thing. Think about digging a hole in the dirt. When you dig up one thing, the dirt you removed has to go somewhere. The kind of uncovering that characterizes the essence of technology is Gestell, or enframing. Enframing is a way of uncovering things that necessarily prevents other modes of uncovering and revealing. Technological enframing reveals all things as energy to be unlocked, transformed, transferred and stored.

Sartre

Sartre says that the basic premise of existentialism is that for humans, existence precedes essence.  In other words, a person must exist before she has an essence (character, personality). 

Existentialism has been accused of 1) emphasizing all that is despicable about humanity, 2) encouraging inaction and despair, 3) undermining the validity of human existence, and 4) undermining human solidarity by focusing on subjectivity.

In response to (1), Sartre says that existentialist fiction may seem more despicable because the characters in existentialist novels and play are presented as being responsible for their behavior.  In other words, villains are villains because they want to be terrible people (whereas other literature may present them as a victim of circumstance).

In response to (2), Sartre says that the kind of despair important to existentialism is the basis for action.  Despair is just what happens when you have a decision to make and you contemplate which option would be best.  The decision-making process is despair.  Also, according to existentialism, you are defined by your actions.  So someone who does not act is 'nobody'.

In response to (3), Sartre says that all projects have validity insofar as they are chosen by a free consciousness.  Although there may not be an external, eternal source of values, we can validate values in an intersubjective space.

In response to (4), Sartre points out that the 'subjectivity' existentialism is concerned with is an intersubjectivity.  This means that each individual is within a community and each person is constituted by his or her social connections.  There are no meaningful projects without social meanings.  So Sartre says that subjectivity (as intersubjectivity) should be understood not as individual consciuosness but our ability to go beyond individual consciousness.

Sartre Context

Like Descartes and Locke, Sarte is a dualist. He thinks there are only two kinds of substances that exist: Being and Nothingness. Being includes physical bodies in the world, including our own bodies. Nothingness is our consciousness. Nothingness determines itself and is radically free. Being is externally determined. As humans, we are both Being and Nothingness. Our consciousness is free even if our physical existence is determined by external forces. One of the results of our dual nature is bad faith. Bad faith means that you always tend to get wrapped up either in your Being or your Nothingness. If you think you have more freedom than you actually do, you're lost in your transcendence. If you think you have less freedom than you actually do, you're lost in your facticity. Bad faith is a basic structure for humanity. We cannot escape it.

Sartre recognizes that many people associate existentialism with despair. Indeed, this is not a necessary consequence of buying into the notion that for humans existence precedes essence (our actions define who we are). Rather, despair just seems to be a common response to the feelings of responsibility that arise when we recognize that we are in control of deciding our own character

Mill and Kant: Visit My Other Blog

Hello, there!

As I mentioned in class, you can find lots of useful posts about Mill and Kant on my other blog, ethicswithlouise.blogspot.com.

Connections to Other Materials

Here is a link to a Simon & Garfunkel song that deals with determinism in human life, called "Patterns".

This song, "Free Life", is from Dan Wilson.  The narrator of this song takes for granted that there is such a thing as a free life.

In this post, I relate determinism to Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse 5.

Here I link to the implicit bias tests.  Is unconscious bias preventable?  Are we responsible for it?

Moral Responsibility Revisited

Here are many links to other posts about the readings for moral responsibility:

DoC vs PAP

PAP vs. PPP

Van Inwagen vs. Frankfurt

No True Scotsman Informal Fallacy

Heaven, Hell and Strawson

Strawson's Basic Argument & Responses to the Basic Argument

Shame vs. Guilt

Moral Responsibility and PAP

In this post, I define some basic terms.  Here I talk about PAP and moral responsibility. 

Here I give answers for Pfizz #1.

In this post, I describe the Jones and Black thought experiments that Frankfurt discusses

Rap and Responsibility

In "Market Made Murder", rapper Sims (of Doomtree) considers the ways in which modern Americans may be subjected to forces beyond their own personal control.  This song, featuring fellow Doomtree MC and SoCal native Mike Mictlan, seems to raise many problems about free will and the possibility of moral responsibility in our country.

PID and Moral Responsibility

PAP, otherwise known as the principle of alternative possibilities, is the claim that someone is not morally responsible for actions when he could not have done otherwise.  How we define a person certainly has consequences, then, for claims about personal moral responsibility.  Recall that Locke thinks that humans and animals are different than machines because whereas machines must be operated by someone, humans and other animals are the source of their own movement. If determinism is true, then it seems like even our own thoughts are mechanical insofar as they are caused by external forces.  So if humans are 'mechanical' in this sense, then they never seem to have the ability to act other than they have.  As a result, it seems like humans could never be morally responsible. 

Derren Brown Messes with Memory

In this post, I talk about a short clip where Derren Brown messes with Simon Pegg.

This clip might make us worry that memory is too unreliable to serve as a criterion for personal identity.

Parfit on Personal 'Identity'

The problem of personal identity is the question about how we define a person.  In other words, what makes me me?  How do we decide if there is some person who is the same person as me?  Locke answers this problem by saying that personal identity consists of autobiographical memories.  Reid shows that this theory will violate the transitivity of identity.  Parfit's contribution to the literature on the problem of personal identity is to note that strict numerical identity might not be the appropriate concept.  Rather, he talks about survival.  The question of whether you survive is the same question as whether there is some person who is you.  In the links below, I discuss the difference between identity and survival in more detail.

Parfit on PID.

Identity vs. Survival.

The Memory Theory of Personal Identity and Star Trek

In season 1, episode 7 of Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, entitled "Dax", the trill species is explored in some detail.  Trill are a species that can serve as a host for a symbiont species.  In other words, a small, crab-like conscious organism can be joined with the internal organs of a trill so that two consciousness are joined into one.  Upon joining, all memories & experiences of the symbiont and its prior hosts are incorporated into the consciousness of the host.  Jadzia Dax is a crewmember on DS9.  Dax is the name of the symbiont.  Jadzia is the name of the woman who is joined with the symbiont.  Although they were once two separate consciousnesses, Jadzia Dax is now one single consciousness.  In this episode, Jadzia is charged with a crime committed when the symbiont was joined with a prior host, Curzon.  In the episode, the characters debate whether Jadzia Dax is a different person than Curzon Dax and whether she should be responsible for what Curzon has done. 

In episode 8 of the same season, a criminal tries to escape punishment by hiding in the consciousness of other beings.

Both these episodes raise questions relevant not only to personal identity, but also to moral responsibility (our next topic)

BTW, all seasons of Star Trek: Deep Space Nine are available on netflix or on amazon prime.  Amazon prime is free to students for one year if you register with your .edu email address.  Just sayin...

Locke vs. Parfit

In this post, I link to other posts about Locke and Parfit on the topic of personal identity.

Lots of Locke!

In this post, I write about the problem of personal identity and Locke.

In this one, I explain how different things have different criteria for identity, according to Locke.

Here I give some context for Locke.

AND HERE I link to two tracks from members of MN hip hop collective Doomtree: P.O.S.'s De la Souls & Dessa's The Man I Knew.

Locke on Living Things

"That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants." (Bk. II, Ch. XXVII, sect. 4)

In the above passage, Locke explains that the identity of a plant is determined by the fact that a plant participates in 'one common life' with 'an organization of parts' in one body.  Even though the life is 'communicated to new particles of matter', these new particles are 'vitally united' to the plant.  Vital here means not only essential but also related to the life of the plant (c.f., vital signs, vitality).

Even a cell is a living thing with an organization of parts.  The different parts of the cell each have a function in preserving and perpetuating the life of the cell.  Although the specific particles or atoms that make up the cell may change over time, the life is a continuous one.  The body may exchange some particles for others, but it remains coherent.